Campaign success must include stabilization operations so that non-state actors, such as criminal organizations, insurgents, rebel opposition groups, local militia, and warlords among others cannot re-gain a foothold by exploiting the oppressed. Furthermore, while there may still be fighting going on in the vicinity of employed ESTs, they will have the unique capability to continue their work toward stability operations. This focus on stability operations is the critical role ESTs play in the Dominate phase, and enables a smooth transition to the remaining phases leading to conflict termination. Our emerging doctrine clearly recognizes the importance of the actions following combat as noted in DODD 3000.05:
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission. … They should be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities, including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. 7 While some might say little has been done regarding the implementation of these directives, the EST is the perfect model to help facilitate transition from combat through stability operations and ultimately to civilian control of the situation. Why ESTs? In order to answer this question we must first explore EST's roots and evolution, which began with CAP.
Combined Action Platoons
Everyone sees the debate regarding the U.S. policy on Iraq daily in the news. The indisputable constant is that we must win the trust and confidence of the citizens in order to achieve success. Currently, we are not fully exploiting all the resources we possess. Yet the framework is available, and the model has been tested. So it is time to reconsider the use of our soft power potential, in much the same way the Marine Corps used the CAP program during the Vietnam conflict, to achieve results now! However, out-of-the-box thinking is required organizationally and operationally as well.
Such thinking must involve not only interdepartmental, but also intradepartmental alliances and partnering. It will also require some calculated risk taking. When Department of State (DOS), United Nations, or other civilian organization follow behind military forces, ESTs can provide an efficient, effective bridge for transition from military authority to civilian authority. They can enhance stability operations to achieve greater success.
Stability will not be achieved without realistic methods for ensuring that the chosen solutions are selected with the concurrence of the local affected citizens. Such solutions must meet not only their physical needs, but also their cultural and religious needs. Embedded
Strengths Teams that work closely with the local population for extended periods of time will be our greatest resource for assessing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) 12 of our efforts. Ongoing, valid assessments enable stability operations to take hold and expand toward success.
There is rarely a clear line of demarcation between combat and stability operations. In war it is often fluid. One area may be stabilizing, restoring services, and maintaining security, while
another area within close proximity may be in the heat of battle, months if not years from this kind of progress. Stability operations must remain flexible; mandated change is always resisted and rarely successful. Figure 1 provides a schematic of just such a transition. 2. There comes an in-between time when the old is gone but the new has not been fully accepted. We call this time the "neutral zone". Critical psychological realignments and repatternings take place in the neutral zone.
3. The transition begins to succeed when the populace embraces a new beginning. Then the people develop a new identity as they emerge from the transition and make a new beginning. Then the people develop a new identity, experience new energy, and discover a new sense of purpose. The change is working. forces to deal with them." 16 Hammes then elaborates on this new model:
To achieve success, we must be prepared to fight across the spectrum of political, economic, social, and military spheres. We not only have to win battles, we have to fill the vacuum behind them -starting with rapidly establishing security. This means just not police and security forces, but also the court system and prison system to support them. We must establish banking, currency, public health organizations, public sanitation, air traffic control, business regulation, a system of taxation and every other process needed for running a modern society. And all of these must be done in conjunction with the people of that nation. We know that solutions imposed from outside rarely remain in effect once the occupying power leaves. 17 Our current reliance on sophisticated armaments and technology, rather than building on and supporting existing human ingenuity to complete the transition, is negating valuable resources. "Instead of expensive weapons, we must…invest in human capital, developing expertise in an adversary's language, culture, and history." 18 The U.S. is currently reviled in many parts of the world, especially the Middle East, because we are perceived as trying to impose our values, culture, and governmental structures on other countries. But we have learned much over the years about our enemies and those they and cultures, we will better position the civilian teams that follow for greater success with minimal loss of life.
Our enemies have creatively used our own technology against us. They have studied us by every means possible and know us quite well. They watch our television endlessly. They know that we crave quick-fix solutions. They note that in 30 to 60 minute television segments, we overcome a crisis and reach a happy resolution. We are a nation seeking instant gratification with short attention spans. We do not have staying power; we want to achieve our objectives rapidly. In fact, the nation is tired of this current war. "What American family looks forward to the daily news of the results of another IED attack, the downing of an American helicopter, or a truck bombing at a U.S. military post?" 21 The terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks themselves acknowledged the reality of a "long war"; they had been in and out of the United States for years. They built lives, formed identities, and established relationships requiring years to achieve. Our military forces, as well as our political leadership, need to demonstrate a similar patience to sustain a protracted campaign. If we remain impatient and keep looking for instant fixes, 4GW strategies will continue to be very successful against us.
The U.S. Armed Forces add to this problem by insisting on limiting tours of duty in combat zones to periods as brief as six months and rarely longer than one year. Thus our military personnel become mere placeholders in the region of strife. The experience they gain when working with the local citizens is wasted when they are rotated every year or more frequently.
More importantly, whatever trust and confidence they have earned with the local populace goes away when they do! When a tour of duty lasts only six months our personnel do not assimilate their new experiences. We must acknowledge that 4th-Generation Wars do not lend themselves to quick-fix solutions as:
Fourth generation warfare uses all available networks --political, economic, social and military --to convince the enemies' political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. 22 We are engaged in a long, irregular war on terrorism and we need to face that reality.
Success will take patience, perseverance, and commitment. If the U.S. is not willing to unleash all of the technological capability developed since WWII to win all-out war, then we must develop alternatives to achieve success in this new and unfamiliar environment. Additionally, these recommendations emphasize the need for interservice and interdepartmental collaboration. The uses of ESTs perfectly meet these requirements.
In Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, Alan Dershowitz speaks of a "…conceptual shift in emphasis from a theory of deterrence to a theory of prevention, a shift that carries enormous implications for the actions a society may take to control dangerous human behavior." 24 Dershowitz brings us face to face with the "Us and Them" mentality as well as our own prejudices in the matters of preventive and preemptive actions.
Prevention refers to … steps undertaken to disable or dispense with a potential threat at a very early stage while still gathering. Preemption, by contrast, is action intended to eliminate a more concrete and immediate threat. Both stand in contrast to deterrence, the doctrine that prevailed during the nuclear stand-off of the Cold War.
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His thought-provoking words provide further justification for the Embedded Strengths
Teams. We must abandon our Cold War mentality and dismiss a primary reliance on deterrence and reaction. We must be proactive and engage the enemy on his playing field. We especially need to position ourselves to combat his ability to influence his people and the citizens of the world. But we cannot do this without knowing the culture of the enemy we are confronting, and of the citizens we are protecting. Only by living among the people can ESTs acquire sure and intimate knowledge of their culture.
The fact that Dershowitz has spent his career as an advocate for civil rights makes his arguments especially powerful. Our nation has been built on Judeo-Christian law: "For hundreds of years, a fundamental principle of Western justice [based on Abraham pleading with God to
save Sodom] has been the doctrine that 10 guilty people should go free rather than one innocent person be wrongly convicted." 26 The EST model enables us to differentiate between the enemy and the innocent because we will live among the local citizens and gain on-theground relevant insights. When they are without electricity or water, we will be without as well.
The U.S. is perceived by much of the international community as a bully -a Goliath, so those we aggressively engage are the Davids. Preemptive action from a Goliath will be regarded as unprovoked aggression. Preemptive action from a David will be seen as a protective self-defense measure. One of the cornerstones of U.S. culture is respect for freedom of the individual. Preemption by the state negates that freedom and presents the state as a
Goliath. Therefore, we must adopt a stance of prevention that will place us in positions to preempt only if there is no other course of action. And, because we are perceived as a Goliath,
we must be able to clearly, and quickly, justify our preemptive actions to the international community.
Present and future military encounters require an emphasis on balance, on utilizing all the resources at our disposal. We no longer have contained and well-defined targets on which to employ our superior technology. The targets are most often dispersed non-state actors intermingled with innocent citizens; they are using unconventional and simple strategies to gain an advantage and achieve victory. To compete in this arena, we must be willing to engage differently than we have done in the past or are doing now.
The strategic model of the three-legged stool clearly demonstrates that we must engage the proper balance of ways and means to achieve the ends of peace and stability. We need to balance our resources with our available personnel, using soft power to achieve our objectives.
Our enemies have adapted the fighting technique. They know we are not prepared to use our full arsenal; indeed our enemies are banking on our restraint. By leveraging the capabilities, wisdom, and judgment of all the soft power military resources at our disposal, we will be in a better position to gain the necessary information and perspectives to make decisions regarding preemption or prevention.
Our nation must focus on the human component -both from the most basic necessities of life to the cultural, religious, social, and economic aspects of a good quality of life, especially as we enable the transition from military operations to civilian control. In order to accomplish such goals, it is important that ESTs are formed with other key skills in mind. Hares are the creative, idea-generating members. Hares are the risk-takers; however, they lose interest quickly and generally fail to follow through. Owls are project managers; they pave the path to make the idea a reality. Turtles are those that will say we've never done it that way before; turtles are your risk managers. They will bring up every possible thing that can go wrong and try to convince the team that a catastrophe is about to happen. Finally, nothing could be accomplished without the squirrels. These are the proponents of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for which documentation and instructions are written. Presented with a decision tree, they will have a difficult time choosing which path to take. 28 Given effective SOPs, they can take the organization in the right direction.
Significantly each member has a weakness. But these weaknesses are compensated for by the other members of the team. Effective leaders thus focus on strengths of their team members, rather than weaknesses. Captain Danner embodies this in his selection of members for the CAP he led in Haditha.
Some Americans expect everyone to speak English and disrespect those who don't. I sought out some Marines who were immigrants to the U.S. and English was a second language. My rationale was that they would be more tolerant with language difficulties than others might be. Revolution." Leadership truly is a delicate balancing act. But the best leaders highlight the strengths of their people so that they glow in the sunlight of a thriving organization, rather than waste away like Sundials in the Shade. 31 As strategic leaders build ESTs, they must assure that they are bringing together the proper mix of skills and human dispositions. They should not spend much time or effort to strengthen the perceived weaknesses in their people. Rather, they should encourage and exploit the strengths and talents already found in the team members.
The unique success of an EST relies on identifying team members' talents and strengths so that leaders and team members can be more productive and successful. Imagine how much more effective and productive a team would be with all members performing tasks in areas in which they had demonstrated talent or interest. There will be less need to "sell" the value of the task, to motivate, and to train individuals to perform functions they already do well. Fewer resources would be needed (money and time, particularly) to enhance existing strengths, rather than attempting to overcome weaknesses. Individuals are more apt to excel when they are encouraged and praised for their accomplishments, rather than assisted to improve.
What are the ramifications of this strengths revolution for our commanders engaging in 4GW? First, they must exhibit strategic leadership rather than good management. They must work with others to initiate change. They must maintain an awareness of the bigger picture through their vision of the organization's end state. As stewards of the profession, strategic leaders influence and direct the organization into the envisioned future: 32 We must, therefore, be confident that the general measures we have adopted will produce the results we expect. Most important in this connection is the trust which we must have in our lieutenants. Consequently, it is important to choose men on whom we can rely and to put aside all other considerations. If we have made appropriate preparations, taking into account all possible misfortunes, so that we shall not be lost immediately if they occur, we must boldly advance into the shadows of uncertainty. 33 The following Clearly team members should strive to achieve all skills, but years of experience will develop and refine these skills and differentiate between leaders and members.
Team Composition
To determine the composition of the Embedded Strength Teams, the organizational model already employed by the U.S. Military Forces provides the optimal means for successful operations. Each branch has a specific mission and brings unique capabilities to the force, so the elements are in place for success based on strengths inherent in the model. The screening process for these teams must be rigorous. In order to be assigned to this elite group, the candidate must have endorsements from current superiors, as well as from peers and subordinates and/or current customers or clients. This range of endorsements exploits the 360 review model and clearly reveals the strengths an individual will bring to the team, rather than the areas that need growth or improvement.
For example, Navy Chaplains are unique in that they can serve one tour wearing a USMC uniform, then the next tour of duty in a USCG billet wearing the USCG uniform, and finally the third tour donning their Navy uniform. The Navy Chaplain has the unique ability to act as a sort of chameleon, transitioning effectively among ingrained cultures and traditions. 35 This is business as usual for Navy Chaplains.
We can no longer utilize role-playing for evaluating and training in activities for which cultural intelligence is required. As previously noted, Chaplains' chameleon characteristics are critical. The superficial orientation to new countries that teaches personnel how to say "Good Morning" and "Good Bye" in the national language has become obsolete. As has been noted above, ESTs success will reside in their ability to identify the strengths within the local communities and exploit them, along with their ability to persuade individual leaders to reinforce the message of stability. This cannot be done with a phrase book.
EST To test the concept, this paper proposes that initially, five Chaplains will be selected to serve in ESTs by the Chief of Chaplains at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. They would then go through rigorous training at a joint training facility with the subject matter expert members from joint communities and inter-agencies selected for the initial ESTs. The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 37 is well suited to organize, train, equip, and be the umbrella organization for ESTs, although they could reside under any service or joint organization. (The reader should keep this in mind for the remainder of the paper wherever the term NECC is used.)
A second group would be made up of eight Chaplains, three of whom would be alternates to be used in case there is an emergency or one of the Chaplains needs to be replaced quickly.
At about the 20-month point for the original five Chaplains, the second wave of eight would then deploy to the ESTs. The alternates, if not needed, would observe and periodically return to the NECC to continue modifying and developing the training criteria.
The new group of specially selected Chaplains would receive extensive turnover briefings through After Action Reports (AAR) from the original five EST Chaplains. Turnover should be seamless. The foundation of the EST is that trust is established and maintained so that the rotation is seamless to the community in which the Chaplain will live and work.
If the original Chaplain sees that the new EST Chaplain is not fitting in or does not seem to be able to establish relationships to gain the trust of the local community, then the legacy Chaplain has the responsibility to quickly bring this issue to the attention of the EST's Commanding Officer. Decisions will need to be made quickly to draw from the reserve pool. It may mean that the initial Chaplain may have to extend his tour, a reality of which he had been informed before he signed up for the EST.
In any case, the extended tour length of the Chaplain would be the linchpin between the EST and the community demonstrating U.S. commitment and assurance to the local citizens.
The Chaplain would also impress upon the local leaders of the commitment needed from them to transition fully to reconstructing their community and nation.
Once the initial five EST Chaplains have finished their tours they would then return to the NECC where they would have a follow-on tour as an EST experts and trainer. These Chaplains would contribute to a more detailed and focused training program for subsequent groups of
Chaplains preparing for deployment with ESTs. It will be critical that the first phase team of EST Chaplains be willing to return for periodic in-country training visits with the second team of EST
Chaplains. This would ensure that the second team is not set up for failure; rather they would realize they are supported by their predecessors and can rely on their expertise and experience either through a direct site visit or through periodic teleconferences from the NECC training site.
This EST model, with the Chaplain at its center, can be tailored and easily deployed to a village in the Middle East, Africa, the Philippines, South America, or wherever needed.
The U.S. military has sometimes been slow in executing the cross functional solutions that the business world has been exploiting for over two decades. Moreover, the business community has realized that if you do not measure your progress toward an objective, you cannot ensure that it is being achieved. How will we know if ESTs are successful? Although joint legislation and accompanying regulations mention a requirement for reporting, there is no mention of metrics to demonstrate success. ESTs can help to measure the success of our stability operations. A smooth transition from stability operations to local civilian control of a secure and prosperous environment, along with building new schools, hospitals, city halls, and playgrounds, will be the metrics of success. A Chaplain's success is measured by his ability to move through the land mines of the world's religions without proselytizing or alienating other faiths in attaining these goals.
Conclusion
The time is right to try a different approach by exploiting our soft power assets to the fullest. We can place soft power in the hands of military Chaplains who can often move far easier among the local citizens and gain the trust of influential Imams and religious leaders who might otherwise foster resistance. There can be no "Us and Them." It is only US! This proposal is about redesigning CAPs as ESTs and the need for strategic leaders to be more receptive to the use of soft power to implement ESTs. What better way than by using ready available resources and strengths, like the Chaplain.
Some may think this reliance on ESTs is extremely risky. However, as Clausewitz notes, "Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity. If the leader is filled with high ambition and if he pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles." 38 Embedded Strengths Teams may seem audacious. But they represent just the boldness required in today's environment. Further, Chaplains are strategically selected and trained with the necessary skill set and opportunities to play a central role in initiating this resurrected, redesigned, and redeployed Combined Action Platoon.
The age of deterrence is over. It is no longer a question of who has the bigger gun. Our enemies are networked and flexible. They operate with less hierarchy and with the critical ability to adapt quickly. Employing 4GW for future victories will require compromise between liberal and conservative viewpoints -thinking outside the box is just the beginning. Audacity will be the instrumental characteristic for success.
Admiral Mike Mullen, CNO, has acknowledged our need for a totally new approach to national security: "Today's uncertainty and today's threats are of an entirely unique sort, caused by new challenges. We therefore need a new maritime strategy for this era and for this war -for our time and the incredible and growing challenges that we face." 39 Utilizing our Chaplains in
Embedded Strengths Teams provides a new strategy to resurrect CAPs, a heretofore overlooked resource.
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